Cheap talk and sequential equilibria in signaling games

Cheap talk and sequential equilibria in signaling games. N2 - Well-behaved infinite signaling games may have no sequential equilibria. AB - Well-behaved infinite signaling games may have no sequential equilibria. Overview Fingerprint. Abstract Well-behaved infinite signaling games may have no sequential equilibria. Access to Document Link to publication in Scopus.

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Cheap talk and sequential equilibria in signaling games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint. Reny, Chen, Ying, Manelli, Alejandro M. Villeneuve, More about this item Statistics Access and download statistics Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors.

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